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I     INTRODUCTION 
 
What do historians contribute to law’s understanding of the past 
when they act as expert witnesses in courts? Costas Douzinas argues 
that legal proceedings are unsuitable for clarifying the historical 
record.
1
 Douzinas sees the call for law to judge historical injustices 
to be inspired by a nostalgic turn to collective memory, seeking 
redemptive history as part of national identity construction. He 
maintains that law cannot authenticate history because of the 
different temporal orientations of each discipline and the role each 
performs in narrating the nation.  
 
 
Douzinas takes his cue from Hannah Arendt’s treatise on the 
Eichmann trial,
2
 in which Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann was 
tried for crimes against Jewish people and crimes against humanity.
3
 
The trial is purported to be the first of its type in which an historian 
appeared to give evidence.
4
 Douzinas, following Arendt, argues that 
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criminal trials are inappropriate forums for judging what occurred in 
the past and should not be used for didactic purposes.
5
 However, in a 
study of the role of historians as expert witnesses in international 
criminal proceedings, including the Eichmann trial, Richard Ashby 
Wilson argues that ‘there is a compelling case for rethinking the 
long-standing view that the pursuit of justice and the writing of 
history are inherently irreconcilable’ and that there is ‘no evidence to 
support Arendt’s contention that historical discussions undermine 
due process and fairness’.6  
 
 
Attention to the role of historians in legal proceedings has tended 
to focus on criminal trials. However, in Australia, historical evidence 
has most often been presented in civil proceedings, particularly 
involving Indigenous claimants in native title, stolen generations and 
cultural heritage jurisdictions. Important legal decisions, such as 
Yorta Yorta,
7
 the first case heard under the native title legislation, 
and Cubillo,
8
 the landmark action in relation to compensation for 
members of the stolen generations, demonstrate inconsistent judicial 
approaches to interpretation of historical knowledge and inadequate 
understanding of the way historians approach reading archival 
sources and writing histories. Historians examine archival and other 
sources as fragments that have survived the past and attempt to 
create narratives that have significance in the present to explain what 
happened in the past. Indigenous claims in relation to historical 
injustices demand recognition of responsibility for the past, in the 
present. As such, they necessitate an investigation into history. 
 
 
Where historians have been commissioned to act as expert 
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witnesses, they have often found it difficult to meet the expectations 
of legal counsel when preparing their reports because they take a 
different methodological approach to law.
9
 Historians sometimes 
find their expertise in reading and interpreting archival sources is not 
accorded sufficient weight and their evidence may be subjected to 
rigorous cross-examination. In a number cases, judges have 
questioned whether historians actually have ‘specialised knowledge’ 
that entitles them to give admissible opinion evidence, reflecting an 
assumption that the court is already equipped with the skills 
necessary to interpret archival evidence.
10
 In other cases, judges 
have suggested that historians called as experts have failed 
sufficiently to distinguish between their opinions and the facts which 
form the basis of the opinions,
11
 because they have not clearly 
exposed the reasoning which has led to the opinion.
12
 In some cases, 
historians have been accused of displaying bias.
13
 Judges have also 
expressed concern that in the preparation of experts’ reports, there 





Historians also participate as expert witnesses in legal claims in 
other settler colonial contexts, such as New Zealand and North 
America. In New Zealand, the involvement of historians has largely 
been in the context of Waitangi Tribunal hearings,
15
 where they 
perform an important role.
16
 Unlike Australian native title litigation, 
Waitangi Tribunal investigations are explicit inquiries into history 
through an inquisitorial process. There are extensive archival 
resources available for these inquiries because they date from the 
                                                 
9
  Ann Curthoys, Ann Genovese and Alexander Reilly, Rights and Redemption: 
History, Law and Indigenous People (UNSW Press, 2008) 100-1.  
10
  Harrington Smith v State of Western Australia (No 7) [2003] FCA 893 
(Harrington-Smith). 
11
  Ibid [21]. 
12
  The law of evidence requires this distinction: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 97. 
13
 For example, Risk v Northern Territory (2006) FCA 404. 
14
  Harrington Smith [15]-[20]. 
15
  The Waitangi Tribunal was established in 1975 to investigate claims brought 
by Maori individuals or groups, of contemporary breaches of the Treaty of 
Waitangi by the Crown. From 1985, its jurisdiction was expanded to include 
historical claims of injustice from the date of the Treaty signing in 1840. 
16
  Historians are employed to conduct the Tribunal’s own independent 
investigations and are included as members of the decision making body. 





 century, when documentation of colonial activities was prolific. 
It also includes sources written by Maori people. In the United 
States, the Indian Claims Commission, established in 1946 to 
investigate grievances of American Indian tribes against the federal 
government involved the participation of expert witnesses, largely 
ethno-historians who draw on anthropological and archaeological 
frameworks in the interpretation of documentary sources. In Canada, 
subsequent to the decision in Calder v British Columbia,
17
 which 
affirmed the existence of Aboriginal title held prior to colonisation, a 
series of significant cases involved historians as expert witnesses.
18
 
One distinctive characteristic of the Canadian context is the 
existence of the extensive archive of the Hudson’s Bay Company, a 
fur trading company dating from 1670, long before the establishment 
of the Dominion of Canada in 1867. The company established 
trading posts throughout North America where workers were tasked 




This article is divided into two parts. In the first part, I will 
provide an overview of the law concerning historians as expert 
witnesses in Australian courts. I will argue that key cases have 
functioned as catalysts for trends in the involvement of historians in 
Australian litigation. While historians appeared rarely prior to the 
advent of the native title jurisdiction, after the Mabo decision, they 
were more often commissioned by parties and appeared routinely in 
native title cases. Some historians were motivated to become 
involved in litigation as a way of contributing to the political 
environment of reconciliation. This was accelerated in the wake of 
the decision in Yorta Yorta,
19
 the first case to be heard under the 
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). The increased participation of historians 
in litigation in Australia gave rise to important debates about the role 
of expert witnesses drawn from fields in the humanities. 
 
However, research I have conducted indicates that a change 
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occurred in the early 2000s, particularly in the wake of the decision 
in Cubillo,
20
 the landmark action in relation to the stolen 
generations. In the second part of the article, I will report on my 
research into cases heard in the Federal Court since the mid-2000s 
where historical evidence was tendered.
21
 This research indicates 
that while historians are occasionally commissioned by parties to 
research and write reports that may be tendered as evidence in legal 
actions, they have rarely appeared in person in court as witnesses. I 
will argue that courts have had difficulty accepting the expert 
evidence of historians, largely because legal and judicial subjects 
regard the interpretation of the past, specifically the hermeneutic 
processes involved in the interpretation of historical documents, as a 
skill in which they are already well versed. 
 
 
The trend away from engagement with historians in Australian 
litigation is the product of a more general political climate in 
Australia, in operation since the 1990s, which has been hostile to 
historians, particularly those working in the area of settler colonial 
history. As a discipline, history has a particular relationship to the 
national imaginary, as the ‘history wars’ have demonstrated in 
Australia.
22
 As Mark McKenna argues, ‘[e]very nation is brought 
into being through the writing of history’.23 He claims that during 
the ‘history wars’, ‘Australian history was being conscripted, either 
to justify or condemn the nation’.24  
 
 
I will suggest that the antagonism and scepticism towards 
historians expressed in the Australian history wars has had an impact 
on legal proceedings where historians appear as expert witnesses. 
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Furthermore, I will argue that debates within the disciplinary field 
gave rise to concerns about the potential ethical and methodological 
compromises involved in historical research conducted for the 




II     HISTORIANS AS EXPERT WITNESSES IN 
AUSTRALIAN COURTS 
 
The admission of evidence by those who have expertise has a long 
history in the common law, yet the Australian High Court has rarely 
provided guidance on the principles regarding its admissibility.
25
 
Expert evidence is admissible under an exception to the rule which 
excludes opinion evidence, where the person has ‘specialised 
knowledge’ based on their ‘training, study and experience’.26 
‘Specialised knowledge’ is knowledge of matters that is outside the 
knowledge or experience of ordinary persons; it must be sufficiently 
organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of 
knowledge.
27
 Expert evidence is admissible in legal proceedings on 
the basis that it is beyond the type of knowledge that people are 
likely to acquire in the course of their ordinary, general experience 
of life, and therefore potentially beyond the knowledge of the judge 
or members of the jury.
28
 Expert witnesses must demonstrate that 
they have specialised knowledge based on their training, study or 
experience and the opinion expressed must be wholly or 
substantially based on that knowledge. The opinion evidence will be 
inadmissible if the court could itself make such an inference on the 




                                                 
25
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Research on the reception of expert opinion evidence in Australia 
and other common law jurisdictions has raised serious concerns 
about the admission in criminal proceedings of unreliable and 
speculative evidence from fields such as forensic science and 
medicine. Critics argue that courts have failed to adequately 
investigate the reliability of incriminating expert opinion evidence 
called by the prosecution, potentially leading to wrongful 
convictions and miscarriages of justice.
30
 It has been suggested that 
the primary consideration has been the effectiveness of expert 





However, there has been limited scholarly attention to expert 
evidence from the fields in the humanities and social sciences, such 
as history, anthropology and linguistics, which is most often given in 
civil litigation.
32
 Anthropologists began appearing as expert 
witnesses in the 1970s as a result of the introduction of land rights 
legislation in the Northern Territory in Australia.
33
 In the first 
significant decision dealing with admissibility of opinion evidence 
from an anthropologist,
 
Justice Blackburn discussed whether the 
evidence presented was hearsay because it was based on what the 
anthropologist had been told by Indigenous informants. The judge 
concluded that: ‘[t]he anthropologist should be able to give his 
opinion based on his investigation by processes normal to his field of 
study, just as any other expert does’.34 Since then, Australian courts 
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3 University of Denver Criminal Law Review 31. 
31
  Ibid 91. 
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History and Native Title, Native Title Research Series, (Aboriginal Studies 
Press, nd); Christine Choo and Shawn Hollbach (eds), History and Native 
Title, Special Issue (2003) 23 Studies in Western Australian History; Iain 
McCalman and Ann McGrath (eds), Proof and Truth: The Humanist as Expert 
(The Australian Academy of the Humanities, 2003); Curthoys, Genovese and 
Reilly, above n 9; Anne Carter, ‘The Definition and Discovery of Facts in 
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299. 
33
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have largely been prepared to accept the evidence of anthropologists 
as expert opinion evidence not strictly subject to hearsay objections. 
 
 
Similar objections were also made initially in relation to the 
evidence of historians. Courts drew a distinction between the ‘facts’ 
of history and historical analysis based on textual sources and 
delivered as opinion, which was designated as hearsay evidence. In a 
decision which has attained authority, Justice Young distinguished 
between the ‘basal facts’ of history ‘such as when a particular war 
broke out or other matters of record from reputable histories’ and 
analyses as to ‘why certain things happened and generally how 
people behaved’, which he concluded was not a matter which can be 





As a result of the strict application of the hearsay rule, historians 
appeared rarely in Australian courts until the introduction of land 
rights legislation. Outside of Indigenous claims, historians have 
appeared in the Federal Court primarily in administrative law 
matters such as veteran’s affairs; and in State courts in a limited 
range of matters in the areas of environmental planning and 
assessment; defamation; and negligence. 
 
 
A     Native Title Jurisprudence 
 
From the early 1990s, the development of native title jurisprudence, 
as well as other areas for Indigenous claims, including litigation 
concerning the legality of genocide,
36
 cultural heritage claims
37
 and 
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  Bellevue Crescent Pty Ltd v Marland Holdings Pty Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 
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Commonwealth [1998] 195 CLR 337.  
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compensation by members of the stolen generations,
38
 resulted in 





 the case that defined native title in Australia, it was 
undoubtedly the impact of the published work of historians, 
including Henry Reynolds, which ultimately influenced the outcome 
in the High Court.
41
 A number of the justices cited Reynolds’ book 
The Law of the Land in their decisions.
42
 Mabo is considered the 
case that tested the nation on historical knowledge — it begged the 
question of what narrative we were to construct about what 
happened in the past — yet the role of historians as experts in the 
proceedings was not contested. Robert van Krieken claims that while 
historical evidence had previously been excluded in Australian 
courts, after the High Court’s decision in Mabo, law developed 
‘cognitive openness’ to historical evidence, largely as a result of the 
impact of Reynolds’ scholarship.43 Reynolds’ work was also cited in 





These cases demonstrate the influence of Indigenous activism and 
developments in Australian historical scholarship on judicial 
decisions. They also incited indignation among conservatives, 
including some historians, because they challenged the ‘sustaining 
national narrative’ that had dominated historical scholarship since 
                                                 
38
  Cubillo (2000) 174 ALR 97. 
39
  In the trial case heard by Justice Moynihan in the Queensland Supreme Court, 
as part of the Mabo litigation, the respondent, the State of Queensland called 
an historian, Dr Ruth Kerr, as a witness: B A Keon-Cohen, ‘The Mabo 
Litigation: A Personal and Procedural Account’ (2000) 24 Melbourne 
University Law Review 893, 927. 
40
  Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Mabo). 
41
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only by the material placed before us by the parties but by the researches of the 
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necessarily ventured’. Mabo (1992) 175 CLR 1 [78]. 
42
  Henry Reynolds, The Law of the Land (Penguin, 1987), cited in Mabo (1992) 
175 CLR 1 (Deane, Gaudron and Toohey JJ).  
43
  Robert van Krieken, ‘Law's Autonomy in Action: Anthropology and History in 
Court’ (2006) 15(4) Social and Legal Studies 574. 
44
  Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1. 





 As Stuart Macintyre and Anna Clark point 
out, while Indigenous dispossession would seem to be an 
indisputable historical fact resulting from settler colonial 
pastoralism, farming and mining, it was the formal recognition of 
this fact through land rights legislation and High Court recognition 
of native title that triggered conservative resistance, including 
allegations of judicial activism.
46
 The conservative resistance also 
resulted in considerable compromise in the drafting of native title 
legislation, making it a far more restrictive regime than what had 
been available under land rights legislation. 
 
 
Under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), claimants are required to 
meet a legal, as well as an historical, burden of proof to establish the 
existence of native title: they must provide evidence that they 
possess communal, group or individual rights and interests in 
relation to land or waters under traditional laws and customs.
47
 This 
is an onerous burden of proof, requiring that claimants demonstrate 
on-going connection to the land in question, dating back to the 
assertion of colonial sovereignty. In this sense, it is an historical 
inquiry requiring proof of historical facts. Expert evidence may be 
given from a range of disciplinary fields, including history, 
anthropology, linguistics and archaeology.
48
 However, such 





Where a historian is commissioned by a party to conduct research 
and provide evidence, they are contributing to the process of proving 
the material facts concerning the claimants’ connection to the land in 
question under Indigenous traditional laws and customs. The oral 
                                                 
45
  Paul Ashton and Anna Clark, ‘Introduction: Rethinking Australian History’ in 
Paul Ashton and Anna Clark (eds), Australian History Now (NewSouth 
Publishing, 2013) 17. 
46
  Stuart Macintyre and Anna Clark, The History Wars (Melbourne University 
Press, 2003) 149. 
47
  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 223. Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 
316 [114]-[117] (Beaumont and von Doussa JJ); Daniel v Western Australia 
[2003] FCA 1425; Harrington Smith v State of Western Australia (No 7) 
[2003] FCA 893. 
48
  Sampi v Western Australia [2005] FCA 777 (10 June 2005) [951]. 
49
  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 82(1). 
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testimony of claimants is crucial to this process because they can 
offer first-hand accounts.
50
 However, in most parts of Australia, this 
requires evidence that precedes the collective memory of living 
witnesses.
51
 Historians may be able to contribute to the process 
through examination of archival records. They are able to offer 
broad contextual knowledge based on their expertise and can draw 
on that knowledge to attribute meaning to the material traces of 
evidence available. Historians have particular skills to offer to this 
process based on their knowledge of working with colonial archives. 
 
 
Public records are the basis of this form of historical analysis and 
the colonial venture in Australia amassed an enormous archive of 
documentation relating to the regulation of Aboriginal people. 
Bureaucratic record keeping is a well-established technology of 
control and colonial nations produce administrative records for 
national purposes in the affirmation of settler sovereignty. Colonial 
archives are therefore an unreliable source of historical authority 
because they largely reflect the perspective of the settler-colonial 
administration. However, as native title barrister, Tina Jowett, 
argues, in native title proceedings, historians can offer particular 
skills, firstly, in locating, reading, collating and distilling 
voluminous primary source documents, and secondly, using their 
knowledge of theories of historiography and epistemology to assist 
the court in interpreting those documents by examining the 
subjective perspectives of the authors and contextualising the 
observations for the court.
52
 Historians have particular skills in 
                                                 
50
  Evidence of an opinion expressed by a member of an Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander group about the existence or content of the traditional laws and 
customs of the group may be given as an exception to the opinion rule: 
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 78A. This section was introduced under the 
Evidence Amendment Act 2008 (Cth), subsequent to the recommendations of 
the Australian Law Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law: Report (No 
102). It also exists in the NSW Act and in the more recent Uniform Evidence 
Law Acts in other jurisdictions. 
51
  Vance Hughston and Tina Jowett, ‘In the Native Title “Hot Tub”: Expert 
Conferences and Concurrent Expert Evidence in Native Title’ (2014) 6 Land, 
Rights, Laws: Issues of Native Title 1. 
52
  Tina Jowett, ‘Does an Historian have “specialised knowledge” to provide 
expert evidence in native title proceedings: Some recent issues’ (Paper 
presented to AIATSIS Native Title Conference, Cairns, June 2007). 
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reading textual sources ‘against the grain’, including identifying 
silences, biases, contradictions and lies in the already problematic 










 historiography was crucial to the outcome. The respondent, 
the State of Victoria, called two historians, Dr Marie Fels and Ms 
Susan Priestley and the applicants called anthropologist, Mr Rod 
Hagen, to present both historical and anthropological evidence. 
However, in his decision, Justice Olney relied to a large extent on 
his own interpretation of historical sources, namely, the published 
writings of a pastoral squatter and amateur ethnographer, Edward 
Curr, and the recorded observations of Chief Protector George 
Robinson. Justice Olney found the claimants’ oral testimony 
acceptable only where it was supported by the documentary 
evidence; this resulted in the decision that native title had been 
extinguished. In this way, he accepted on face value the observations 
of the colonists with a direct interest in dispossession of the Yorta 
Yorta people and used it as the standard for assessment of all other 
evidence. Justice Olney also drew inferences from an 1881 petition 
for land, submitted to the Governor of New South Wales, by 42 
Indigenous people who had been dispossessed as a result of 
increasing use of the land for pastoral purposes, to find that the 
Yorta Yorta were ‘no longer in possession of their tribal lands and 
had ... ceased to observe those laws and customs based on 
tradition’.56 In this way, Justice Olney performed the role of 
historian in interpreting the colonial archive, but failed to subject it 
to critical evaluation and to contextualise it in light of other evidence 
available. The approach taken by Justice Olney prompted an outcry 
                                                 
53
  For example, Bruce Pascoe has recently argued that, contrary to the accepted 
historical account of hunter-gatherer nomadic life style, Aboriginal people 
were actually engaged in agricultural and aqua-cultural methods and lived in 
permanent dwellings at the time settler colonists appeared in Australia. He 
claims that by examining the journals and diaries of explorers and colonists 
with a new historical perspective, ‘we see a vastly different world from the 
same window’: Bruce Pascoe, Dark Emu (Magabala Books, 2014) 12. 
54
  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). 
55
  [1998] FCA 1606 (18 December 1998). 
56
  Ibid [121]. 
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by historians and was described by Chief Justice Black, in minority 
on appeal, as erroneously adopting a ‘frozen in time’ approach.57 
 
 
The decision in Yorta Yorta established the evidentiary threshold 
for proof of the existence of native title, where Indigenous claimants 
are required to demonstrate that their ancestors were the original 
occupiers of the land in question and that they have maintained on-
going connection to country subsequent to European colonisation. 
Furthermore, in 1998, amendments were made to the Native Title 
Act, requiring the Federal Court to be bound by the rules of evidence 
when hearing native title claims, ‘except to the extent that the court 
otherwise orders’.58 Prior to this amendment, s 82(3) of the Native 
Title Act provided that the court hearing native title claims ‘was not 
bound by technicalities, legal forms, or rules of evidence’. However, 
the Federal Court has rarely used its discretion to suspend the rules 
of evidence in native title hearings. In a 2005 review of the operation 
of evidence law, the Australian Law Reform Commission reported 
that evidence rules were applied inconsistently in native title cases, 
and how they were applied depended on counsel, judges and 
‘improvised solutions’.59  
 
 
Justice Olney’s treatment of the historical evidence led to 
increased involvement of professional historians as expert witnesses 
in Indigenous claims. In a number of native title cases subsequent to 
Yorta Yorta, historians were commissioned by the parties to prepare 
reports and called as expert witnesses to give evidence. For example, 
in Ward (1998),
60
 the applicants called Dr Christine Choo and Dr 
Bruce Shaw; the State of Western Australia called Dr Neville Green 
and the Northern Territory called Dr Cathie Clement. Each of these 
historians was briefed to provide reports, and gave evidence as 
                                                 
57
  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v State of Victoria [2001]  
FCA 45, [64]-[76]. 
58
  Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth), inserting new s 82. 
59
  Australian Law Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 
No 102 (2005) [19.68].  
60
  Ward on behalf of Miriuwung and Gajerrong People and Others v State of 
Western Australia and Others (1998) 159 ALR 483.  
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experts. In Daniel (2003),
61
 the first applicant called two historians, 
Dr Christine Choo and Mr Tom Gara, and the first respondents 
called historian Dr Neville Green. In De Rose (2002),
62
 Dr Robert 
Foster gave expert evidence as an historian on behalf of the 
applicants on a variety of historical documents that he had been 
asked to examine and also wrote two reports. In Neowarra (2003),
63
 
Dr Fiona Skyring, an historian employed by the Kimberley Land 
Council, provided three written reports and gave oral evidence for 
the applicants and Dr Neville Green prepared a report for the State. 
 
 
When a historian is commissioned by a party to conduct research 
and provide evidence, this is likely to be based upon analysis of 
archival documents held in government archives, such as a State 
Records Office or the National Archives of Australia, and archives 
of other agencies, such as religious or commercial enterprises; 
secondary sources in the form of local and family histories; witness 
statements and transcripts of evidence given as evidence in the 
proceedings; as well as books and other publications written by 




Anne Carter argues that historians can assist the legal process 
with two stages of inferential proof: firstly, by taking a ‘broad 
snapshot’ they can influence how courts assess what evidence is 
considered relevant. Secondly, their experience in interpreting the 
colonial archive can inform the types of inferences that can be 
drawn. Carter suggests that the requirement for inferential leaps in 
relation to the legal proof of facts in historical claims provides an 
opportunity for historians to contribute to the process because of 
their skills and experience in uncovering and understanding the 
evidentiary archive.
64 
Furthermore, historians can offer their 
theoretical understanding of settler colonialism as part of the context 
of what remains as historical evidence. 
                                                 
61
  Daniel v State of Western Australia [2003] FCA 666. 
62
  De Rose v South Australia [2002] FCA 1342. 
63
  Neowara v Western Australia [2003] FCA 1402 (8 December 2003). 
64
  Carter, above n 32. 
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However, the experience of historians as expert witnesses in 
native title litigation gave rise to contentions about the role of the 
experts from fields in the humanities. Debates focussed on the 
different approaches taken by lawyers and historians to questions of 
historical validation, particularly the way law and history define 
their relationship to the contested terms of evidence, truth and 
inference.
65
 For centuries, law and history were seen to be closely 
related disciplines, and the traditional methodological approach of 
the historian and the judge were regarded as analogous, based on a 
shared commitment to common sense empiricism, processes of 
forensic inquiry,
66
 and positivist conceptualisations of the notion of 
proof and its relationship to truth. However, there have been a 
number of important influences on the discipline of history over 
recent decades, including the cultural or linguistic turn in humanities 
scholarship through the influence of postmodernism, resulting in 
critiques of the universality of truth. Indigenous activism has also 
forced non-Indigenous historians to rethink the narratives they tell, 
leading to a burgeoning interest in oral and outsider histories. These 
developments have had a profound impact on the Australian settler 
colonial historiography.
67
 However, law has been far less receptive 
to these theoretical developments, particularly in the context of legal 
practice and litigation. Practising lawyers and judges argue that legal 
proceedings are not about seeking access to the truth, but are rather a 
search for the facts.
68
 Such an understanding is at odds with the 
epistemological framework of less empirical fields in the humanities, 
where inquiry is conducted in an interpretative manner, moral 
judgments are inextricable from the process and knowledge is 
always open to contestation. As Greg Lehman argues: 
                                                 
65
  McCalman and McGrath, above n 32; Paul and Gray, above n 32; Choo and 
Hollbach, above n 32. 
66
  Carlo Ginzberg, ‘Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian’ in 
Arnold I Davidson, James Chandler, and Harry Harootunian (eds), Questions 
of Evidence: Proof, Practice and Persuasion Across the Disciplines 
(University of Chicago Press, 1994) 291. 
67
  Ann Curthoys and John Docker, Is History Fiction? (UNSW Press, 2006). 
68
  Hal Wooten, ‘Conflicting Imperatives: Pursuing Truth in the Courts’ in Iain 
McCalman and Ann McGrath (eds), Proof and Truth: The Humanist as Expert 
(The Australian Academy of the Humanities, 2003), 16; Geoff Gray, 
‘Historians in the Courtroom: A Brief Consideration of Some Issues’ in Mandy 
Paul and Geoffrey Gray (eds), Through a Smoky Mirror: History and Native 
Title, Native Title Research Series, (Aboriginal Studies Press, nd) 24.  
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[t]he historic event, which contains real acts, the archaeological site, 
containing real artefacts, the human life, containing real experience, are 
just snapshots in history. They are in themselves meaningless. Without 
an observer or an interpreter, they have no life, no implication for the 
present and no wisdom for the future. The space between the snapshots 
is a vacuum that necessarily fills — drawing interpretation from often 





Mark Dreyfus, one of the counsel in the Cubillo case, argues that 
the difference between historiography and legal methodologies is 
that ‘historians construct narratives’ and that they are required to 
‘select and order material’ and to offer interpretation, that 
‘[d]ifferent historians will offer different narratives of the same set 
of events’, whereas in law ‘the document speaks for itself’.70 He 
concludes that as a result of these different approaches, the law is 
‘essentially unreceptive’ to historical methodology, a situation which 
he claims to be possibly ‘unresolvable’.71 Graeme Davison points 
out that it is only when history is argued as if it were law that law 
appears able to accommodate historical reasoning.
72
 In some 
instances, lawyers have accused historians of misunderstanding the 
role of the law and misconceiving its potential to address historical 
wrongs.
73
 On the other hand, many historians have come to the 
conclusion that the legal process is unresponsive to the nuanced 
interpretation of historical sources that they are able to offer because 
of their professional skills. They argue that law employs a narrow, 
empirically based account that lacks contextual analysis. For 
example, historians acting as expert witnesses point out that they are 
often required to substantiate their conclusions with direct reference 
to identifiable passages in primary sources and to distinguish 
between ‘analysis, synthesis and summary of factual material on the 
                                                 
69
  Greg Lehman, ‘Telling Us True’ in Robert Manne (ed), Whitewash: On Keith 
Windschuttle’s Fabrication of Aboriginal History (Black Inc, 2003) 174, 176. 
70
  Mark Dreyfus, ‘Historians in Court’ in Iain McCalman and Ann McGrath 
(eds), Proof and Truth: The Humanist as Expert (The Australian Academy of 
the Humanities, 2003), 79. 
71
  Ibid 78-9.  
72
  Graeme Davison, ‘History on the Witness Stand: Interrogating the Past’ in Iain 
McCalman and Ann McGrath (eds), Proof and Truth: The Humanist as Expert 
(The Australian Academy of the Humanities, 2003), 59. 
73
  Ibid 65. 
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one hand, and the drawing of inferences on the other’.74 
 
 
Directions such as these have proven difficult for historians to 
satisfy. Fiona Skyring, who was employed by the Kimberley Land 
Council and provided expert evidence in four Kimberley native title 
claims in the Federal Court, has argued that attempts by legal 
counsel to limit or distort the contested nature of historiography and 
seek expert witness reports that are devoid of critical analysis risks 
damaging the reputation of history as a discipline. She suggests that 
the type of history that has been generated by the native title process 
is producing its own branch of historiography, which bears little 
relationship to historical scholarship because it often does no more 






III     DISCIPLINARY CONFLICTS 
 
It was during the early 1990s that the debate about Australian 
historiography became particularly polarised. In 1993, conservative 
historian, Geoffrey Blainey, delivered the Latham Lecture in which 
he coined phrases to describe the ‘three cheers view of history’, 
contrasting it with the ‘black armband view’.76 These expressions 
entered the Australian lexicon and, as Anna Clark points out, from 
this time, ‘the increasing politicisation of Australia’s past 
fundamentally changed the way history was perceived and 
                                                 
74
  Harrington Smith (No 7) [2003] FCA 893 at [40]. Subsequently, 
in Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia 
(No 9) [2007] FCA 31, historical reports were prepared by Mr Craig Muller 
and Mr Chris Stronach. In some cases, anthropologists’ reports have also been 
subjected to judicial criticism for not clearly exposing the reasoning leading to 
the opinions arrived at and failing to meet the requirements of the Evidence 
Act. For example, in Jango v Northern Territory of Australia (No 2) [2004] 
FCA 1004, expert reports of two anthropologists were subject to over 1000 
objections. 
75
  Fiona Skyring, ‘History Wars: Debates about History in the Native Title 
Process’ (2003) 23 Studies in Western Australian History 71. 
76
  Geoffrey Blainey, ‘Drawing up a Balance Sheet of Our History’ (1993) 37(7-8) 
Quadrant 10. 






However, the work of Reynolds and other historians who were 
motivated to become involved in legal claims in support of 
Indigenous rights was not only criticised by conservative public 
commentators. They were also taken to task by academic historians 
on the grounds of their disciplinary methodology. Some 
characterised the approach as ‘juridical history’ — ‘a kind of 
historical work that seeks to present past events in such a way as to 
enable a court of law or some such legal tribunal to address and 
redress historical processes in which the law has been historically 
implicated’.78 Legal history, on the other hand, the critics argued, 
may be characterised as a dispassionate inquiry into the past in order 
to understand it, rather than pass judgement on it. These criticisms 
from the disciplinary field fed into the debates about the 
compatibility of historical scholarship to legal processes. I would 
argue that they contributed to historians’ reticence to act as expert 
witnesses in legal proceedings. 
 
 
The polarised and polemical disputes about Australia’s settler 
colonial history extended well outside the academy to mainstream 
politics and media, and had profound effect on the history 
profession. It also inevitably extended to legal arenas, where 
historians claimed that they were having ‘a hard time’79 when 
appearing as expert witnesses and that they were required to defend 




For example, in Risk (2006),
80
 Justice Mansfield held that the 
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  Anna Clark, ‘The History Wars’ in Paul Ashton and Anna Clark (eds), 
Australian History Now (NewSouth Publishing, 2013) 153. 
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  Bain Attwood, ‘Returning to the Past: The South Australian Colonisation 
Commission, the Colonial Office and Aboriginal Title’ (2013) 34 (1) The 
Journal of Legal History 50, 51. 
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  Curthoys, Genovese and Reilly, above n 9; McCalman and McGrath, above n 
32, 83. 
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historian, Dr Samantha Wells, ‘was not a dispassionate witness’ 
because she ‘clearly firmly believed in the reliability of the views 
she had expressed, and was anxious to persuade as to their 
accuracy’.81 Dr Wells provided expert evidence for the applicants, 
the Larrakia people, in relation to the absence of historical record. 
She appeared for three days, during which time she was examined 
and cross-examined as to the contents of her report and her 
methodology. Justice Mansfield described Dr Wells as someone 
‘whose views are so firmly held’ that their evidence must be 
regarded ‘with some circumspection’ because of ‘the limitations on 
the material she had referred to, and that she had on occasions 
inferred a background or context to certain historical materials to 
understand them as consistent with her view’.82 
 
 
A watershed moment occurred in the treatment of historians as 
expert witnesses in Australian courts in the landmark action in 
relation to the stolen generations. In Cubillo v Commonwealth,
83
 a 
number of historians were commissioned to conduct research and 
write reports and some were called as witnesses. Professor Ann 
McGrath was commissioned by the applicants to prepare a written 
report and was called to appear as an expert witness. Dr Peter Read 
was also commissioned by the applicants to conduct research and 
write a report, although he was not called as a witness. The 




In Cubillo, the respondents opposed the evidence of McGrath in 
its ‘entirety’, objecting to the ‘authenticity of a historian giving 
evidence in court’,84 arguing that the role of the historian was ‘not 
dissimilar’ to that of the judge. McGrath’s written report was not 
received into evidence. She was, however, permitted to give oral 
testimony, on the basis of her report and any assertions she made 
were required to be substantiated through the presentation of her 
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documentary sources, so that the objectivity of her opinion could be 
evaluated by the court. She was subjected to vociferous and 
punctilious challenge under cross-examination, being asked to 
support each element in her reports with reference to textual extracts 
from primary source materials. During the final addresses, 85 pages 
of written submissions were tendered in objection to the evidence of 
McGrath and a further half-day was devoted to criticising her 
evidence during which counsel for the respondent argued that 
McGrath is a historian who utilises a ‘post-modernist analysis’ 
which placed ‘great emphasis on the significance of images, signs 
and language’, to the ‘exclusion of objective truth’.85 Her evidence 
received cursory acknowledgment in Justice O’Loughlin’s decision. 
 
 
The experience of McGrath in the Cubillo trial highlighted the 
challenge presented to law by the influence of postmodernism in 
humanities scholarship, including the writing of history. In history, 
the cultural turn resulted in greater acknowledgment of the unstable 
and partial nature of historical truth. However, as Davison points 
out, ‘[p]racticing lawyers have probably been much more resistant to 
these relativising influences than academic historians’.86 Leigh 
Boucher argues that in the Australian context, ‘the history wars 
made the linguistic and cultural turns in academic Australian 
historical writing look historically and ethically suspect’.87 
 
 
Within these debates, it was therefore not uncommon for 
historians to be called upon to ‘play by the lawyers’ rules’,88 and to 
be accused of a misconceived understanding of the role of the law. 
Practising lawyers and judges argued that the trial is not about 
seeking access to the truth, but is rather a search for the facts. Hal 
Wooten, for example, argued that ‘[h]umanists sometimes assume 
                                                 
85
  Transcript of Proceedings, Cubillo v Commonwealth (Federal Court, 
O’Loughlin J, 21 February 2000) 6494 (Meagher). 
86
  Davison, above n 72, 54. 
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  Leigh Boucher, ‘New Cultural History and Australia’s Colonial Past’ in Paul 
Ashton and Anna Clark (eds), Australian History Now (NewSouth Publishing, 
2013) 290. 
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… that courts are established for the purpose of ascertaining truth’,89 
while ‘others might talk of ascertaining the truth, lawyers usually 
talk of ascertaining “the facts”’.90 Geoff Gray similarly argued that 
historians were displaying naivety in assuming that the ‘court is 
concerned to discover the “truth”’.91 However, an empirical 
approach is inadequate to provide accounts of Indigenous history 
that draws on sources other than archival documents. As Indigenous 
historian Greg Lehman explains: ‘For us, the truth is made up of 
countless contradictory, ironic and provocative elements, woven 
together into an allegorical, sometimes fictive documentation of 
what it is to live our lives’.92 Deborah Bird Rose described the 
experience of historians as expert witnesses as a collision between 
scholarship and adversarial cross-examination, which ‘all too often 
… failed to honour either the integrity of scholarship or the integrity 
of the system of justice that underwrote the whole process’.93 
 
 
In a pivotal study into the relationship between law and history in 
Australian jurisprudence, covering the period up until the early-
2000s,
94
 Ann Curthoys, Ann Genovese and Alexander Reilly found 
that courts may acknowledge that historians have particular skills in 
identifying relevant evidence in archival sources, but they have 
generally been resistant to the idea that they bring special 
interpretative skills to litigation. The authors of this study examined 
a number of cases where historical evidence was in contestation.
95
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They concluded that expert evidence from historians is most readily 
acceptable to law if it is methodologically antiquarian, delivering 
factual information about historical events based on documentary 
sources, and producing history that ‘reifies interpretative text over 
context’.96 The more hermeneutic role of historiography, however, 
such as one that seeks to articulate a ‘redemptive Indigenous history’ 
is not acceptable because it is seen to encroach on the interpretative 
role of the legal decision-maker. 
 
 
A     Historians out of the courtroom 
 
A number of developments have occurred in relation to the role of 
historians as experts in the decade since the study by Curthoys, 
Genovese and Reilly. My research examining cases heard in the 
Federal Court since this time indicates that the collision that 
occurred between historians and the law in Australian courts has 
now resulted in an impasse. In the decade post-Mabo until the early 
2000s, historians were routinely called upon to participate in 
litigation as expert witnesses in native title and other Indigenous 
claims; however, this is no longer the case.
97
 I suggest that this trend 
to exclude historians as expert witnesses indicates that Australian 
courts are generally resistant to the critical methodological approach 
to historical analysis employed by many scholarly historians. Within 
the discipline of Australian history, many historians, particularly 
those who work in good faith with Indigenous people, have been 
forced to rethink the theoretical terms and assumptions of history. 
Minoru Hokari argued that Australian Aboriginal historiography can 
be described as a process that has involved approaches ‘moving as 
close as possible to Aboriginal pasts’.98 Across generations, 
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historians have pursued methodologies which have resulted in less 
essentialising approach to Aboriginal history. However, throughout 
these theoretical movements, law practiced in courts has maintained 
a preference for empirical, positivist historical evidence that is 
readily incorporated into the common law, subject to legal rules and 





There are occasions during this period where historians have been 
commissioned to produce written reports based on archival research 
that has been subsequently admitted into evidence and drawn upon 
in judicial assessment. These research reports often take the form of 
compendiums of information drawn directly from archival sources 
and may therefore lack the form of contextual interpretation that is 
central to history. Historical documents do not ‘speak for 
themselves’ and cannot be used as a solid basis for objective 
knowledge. Judges may not necessarily grasp their meaning and 
implications because they may overlook the extent to which they are 
created by individuals and are therefore ‘just as subjective and 
contingent as other forms of evidence’.100 Furthermore, documents 
alone do not provide narrative coherence, which some argue is 
necessary in legal discourse. When historians do not participate 
directly in litigation, they are not able to offer their skills in 
contextual reading of archives and drawing inferences. Nor are they 
subjected to examination and cross-examination. 
 
 
For example, in Akiba (2010),
101
 a native title claim over an area 
of the Torres Strait, the applicant tendered reports prepared by seven 
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experts, including one historian, Dr Steve Mullins. A conference of 
anthropological experts was ordered, two reports prepared and three 
anthropologists appeared as witnesses. However, while Justice Finn 
described the historian’s report as ‘a very useful aid’, Mullins was 
not called as a witness to speak to his report, nor subjected to cross-
examination. This is despite the fact that the judge described the case 
as uncharacteristically one in which there was an uncommonly large 
and informative historical record and one in which the opinions of 
experts is valuable. Justice Finn devoted considerable attention in his 
judgment to the evidence presented in Mullins’ report. Importantly, 
the historical account of the occupation of the Torres Strait provided 
in summary the judgment, drawn from Mullins’ report and based on 
historical archival and secondary scholarly sources is preserved in 
the common law. As Alexander Reilly points out, as a result of 
native title litigation, history is being interrogated in new ways and 








 two historians, one pre-history expert, and two 
anthropologists prepared reports for the applicants and one historian 
and one anthropologist prepared reports for the respondent, however, 
none of these experts were called to give testimony.
104
 Nevertheless, 
the court relied upon the evidence of the historians to a significant 
extent. Almost the entire judgment is based on material adduced by 
the historians, both for the applicants and the State. In his decision, 
Justice Madgwick commented on the inability to test the evidence of 
the experts in the proceedings.  
 
 
However, in CG (Deceased) on behalf of the Badimia People v 
State of WA,
105
 the historian Dr Christine Choo prepared two reports 
for the applicants. In her first report, she drew on primary archival 
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documents held in the State Records Office of WA and 
Commonwealth archives, files generated by the Aborigines 
Protection Board, the Aboriginal Department and policy department 
files, primary archival documents held in private archives and 
secondary sources in the form of local and family histories. 
Importantly, in her report, Choo pointed out that there is a paucity of 
secondary sources on the claim area apart from local and family 
histories to commemorate events of significance to European settlers 
and that as such the documents are highly Eurocentric in content and 
approach. However, Choo was able to provide evidence of 
Aboriginal occupation of the claim area through a careful reading of 
primary sources and the drawing of inferences. Her reports were 
discussed and relied upon substantially by Justice Barker to 
determine that the claimants were descendants of ancestors who had 
rights and interests in the claim area.  
 
 
Graeme Davison points out that it is only when history is argued 
as if it were law that law appears able to accommodate historical 
reasoning.
106
 In this way, historical evidence is only accepted by law 
when it can be subsumed into law, so that law can claim history as 
itself. The propensity for law to regard legal history, that is, the 
history of legal doctrine and the rules of precedent, as the only valid 
source of history, or historiography, in the courtroom, reveals the 
way law conceptualises both itself and the past. By privileging forms 
of rational knowledge as expertise, the laws of evidence are seen to 
emulate scientific models of proof. The exclusion of other forms of 
knowledge, such as history, serves to negate law’s own 




IV     CONCLUSION 
 
Douzinas may be correct to argue that legal claims concerning 
historical injustices seek a form of redemptive history. However, in 
settler colonial contexts such as Australia, there is an obligation to 
respond to such claims because there is continued benefit derived 
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from the original violence of colonisation. This necessarily involves 
an investigation into what happened in the past, with a view to 
understanding what it means in the present. This is a process that is 
greatly assisted by the skills offered by historians. 
 
 
In the early 1990s, Indigenous native title claims, compensation 
to members of the stolen generations and actions in cultural heritage 
provided opportunities for historians to act as expert witnesses. 
While initially, courts appeared receptive to evidence from 
historians, the research reported upon here indicates that this 
situation has not been sustained. Historians often found that their 
particular expertise in reading and interpreting archival sources was 
not accorded sufficient weight. Judicial officers, on the other hand, 
sometimes raised concerns about the inability of historians to 
distinguish their opinions from the facts that form the basis of their 
opinions, a requirement of evidence law. 
 
 
During this time, the ‘history wars’ emerged in Australian 
political discourse. It is not a coincidence that the emergence of 
native title jurisprudence during the 1990s coincided with public 
debates about the role of history and historians in the national 
imaginary and with renewed approaches to Australian 
historiography. It also coincided with disputes about Australian 
history and a public campaign to discredit Australian historians who 
had provided critical accounts of settler colonial history that were at 
odds with the celebratory and nationalistic accounts which had 
dominated the popular imaginary. Some historians were accused of 
fabricating and misrepresenting historical evidence and of 
advocating political positions, ‘of colluding to deface the past’,107 
rather than adhering to factual evidence found in archival sources.
108
 
These debates, and the way in which they were deployed for 
political gain, had a profound impact on public perceptions of the 
role of historians in narrating the nation. 
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The research presented in this paper suggests that the antagonism 
and scepticism towards historians expressed in the Australian history 
wars has had an impact on legal proceedings where historians appear 
as expert witnesses. From the early 1990s, in the wake of the Mabo 
decision, historians began appearing in Indigenous claims for native 
title and reparatory justice. However, these interdisciplinary 
encounters, where humanists appeared in legal proceedings, 
provoked anxiety about the role of historians, and reflected debates 
occurring in the mainstream in Australia as part of the history wars. 
This has resulted in a diminished role for historians, who, since the 
early 2000s, have rarely appeared in Australian legal proceedings. 
As Anna Clark points out, the history wars highlight a paradox — 
‘the tension between collective remembering and establishing a 
national legacy for the future’ — which demonstrates that their 
impact is not simply about contrasting interpretations of the past, but 
also about the utility of that history.
109
 It is unfortunate that one of 
the ramifications of the history wars has been the retreat of historians 
as expert witnesses from legal proceedings. 
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